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WHAT MAKES THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
DIFFERENT?
Michael B. Kelly*
Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. Shepherd recently posted a working
paper that reports a correlation between tort reforms and the rate of fatal
accidents in the states which adopted those tort reforms.1 They report
that accidental deaths (excluding motor vehicle accidents) declined in
the year after tort reforms were adopted (as compared to the year before)
for a range of reforms: caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive
damages, higher threshold standards for obtaining punitive damages, and
prejudgment interest.2 But reforms to the collateral source rule had the
opposite effect; that is, in states that altered the collateral source rule, the
rate of fatal accidents (excluding motor vehicles) increased in the year
following the reform.3
Both findings raise interesting questions. The first challenges
conventional wisdom because, in theory, tort liability should decrease
*

Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D. 1983, University of Michigan; M.A.
1980, University of Illinois-Chicago; B.G.S. 1975, University of Michigan. I would like to thank
Gail Heriot, Chris Wonnell, and all the participants at the conference for their assistance with the
article.
1. Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, EMORY LAW
SCH. LAW & ECON. Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-17, 2006; EMORY PUB. LAW Working
Paper Group, Paper No. 05-29, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=781424. This paper was originally prepared in response to their working paper prepared on Aug.
10, 2005 and revised on Sept 21, 2005. Some significant details changed in the February version. I
hope my efforts to eliminate any comments unique to the earlier version have succeeded.
2. Id. at 12. The data are somewhat more complex than portrayed here. Before subjecting
the data to multiple regression analysis designed to control for other factors that might explain
changes in the rate of fatal accidents, two different approaches to collateral source reform produced
different results. Fatal accidents increased when states required courts to offset collateral source
payments against the damage award, but decreased if the state simply made evidence of collateral
payments admissible, without requiring offset. Id. When controlling for other factors, both types of
reform to the collateral source rule produced an increase in fatal accidents. Id. at 16. Thus, some of
the decrease following reforms admitting evidence of collateral sources appears to result from
factors other than tort reform – or other than reform of the collateral source rule. Adding motor
vehicle deaths to the data did not substantially change the picture. Id. at 19.
3. Id. at 16.
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accidents. Tort liability forces parties engaged in risk-producing
activities to internalize the costs that the activities impose on those
adversely affected by the risks they create. Rational parties should take
precautions to reduce those risks rather than pay the costs the risks cause
– at least up to the point that further reductions would cost more than the
harms they would prevent. How could reforms that reduce liability, and
thus force parties to internalize a lower portion of the costs suffered as a
result of the risks they create, produce a decrease in fatal accidents? Part
I below briefly considers this question.
The second finding, however, is even more paradoxical. If
reducing tort liability increases safety, why would reductions achieved
by the reforms to the collateral source rule differ from reductions
achieved via other reforms, such as caps on damages or changes to the
prejudgment interest rules? The deterrent effect of damage judgments
depends on the total amount of liability (or expected liability), which
sets the threshold for precautions a rational party will take. The specific
means by which the reduction is achieved arguably should not matter.
Part II considers this puzzle.
This paper offers no stunning conclusions – indeed, no conclusions
at all. At most, it raises concerns that the data produced by Rubin and
Shepherd does not serve their purpose very well. The methodological
questions raised in Part I are modest. But as one begins to parse the
results of the collateral source rule, it becomes harder to credit
inferences from the data on damage caps. The suggestion that more
study is necessary will surprise no one.
I. EFFECT OF TORT REFORM ON FATALITY RATES
Rubin and Shepherd discuss several reasons tort reform might
reduce accident rates. They argue tort liability deters accidents
optimally when five conditions are met: “[D]amages are pecuniary, not
non-pecuniary; injurers and victims are strangers, and not in any preaccident contractual relationship; victims as well as injurers have
incentives to take optimal precautions; the system operates costlessly;
and actions of tortfeastors are harmful, not protective.”4
Where any of these conditions fail, tort liability may impose costs
on the defendant that exceed the optimal level of deterrence. For
instance, attorneys’ fees and other costs make the liability system costly
for potential defendants, even in cases where their conduct did not cause

4. Id. at 1.
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harm to the plaintiff.5 These costs may produce excessive precautions.
In addition to internalizing the costs of the harms they cause, potential
defendants internalize some of the costs of the liability system itself,
thus encouraging precautions that exceed the cost of the harm they might
generate.
One may quibble with some elements of this list. For instance, the
limitation to pecuniary damages rests on the assumption that people
would not pay for insurance against pain, distress, and other nonpecuniary losses, and thus that it is inefficient to deter conduct that
produces these harms.6 Yet pain, distress, and indignity are real
consequences of a tortfeasor’s wrong, imposing real costs (though often
not measured in dollars) on victims. Encouraging tortfeasors to
internalize these costs in deciding whether to impose risks on society
seems plausible.7 Similarly, the ability to negotiate before the accident
may not necessarily produce a better allocation of risks than the tort
system.8
The most interesting condition, however, is the last one. It reminds
us that tort liability affects people whose primary service is to reduce
risks. Doctors, pharmaceutical producers, and manufacturers of medical
equipment come immediately to mind. Reducing the availability of their
goods and services may make the world less safe rather than safer.

5. Attorneys’ fees impose large costs, whether defendants litigate weak claims fully or settle
them to avoid the cost of litigation. In either event, the costs are not produced by wrongful conduct,
but are added to the costs of legitimate claims. Beyond attorneys’ fees, the costs to a business of
spending time on the litigation can be significant. For example, every hour a doctor spends on
discovery or trial is an hour not devoted to patient care and, thus, to earning income. Unlike
attorneys’ fees, the latter costs are unlikely to be covered by insurance.
6. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 7. Unwillingness to insure suggests that the expected
cost of insurance against pain, distress, lost joy, and indignity exceeds the expected gain of
payments for those losses. This equation does not change when the insurance is purchased through
the price of goods and services rather than via a first-party insurer. Nor would it get better when the
premium also includes the cost of litigation, as it does when insured through defendant’s liability
insurer.
7. The absence of insurance may reflect the fact that policies covering pain are not offered,
rather than that they are not desired. One can assume that if people wanted pain policies, insurers
would offer them. As the joke goes, if a $20 bill were really on the sidewalk, someone would
already have picked it up. Other factors might explain the absence of such policies. The difficulty
administering pain insurance may make it an unattractive venture, despite demand. While this
suggests that people will not pay enough to overcome the administrative costs imposed by moral
hazard, it does not necessarily mean that defendants should be free to externalize these costs, or that
economists should be free to assume that the absence of insurance proves that coverage would be
inefficient.
8. As a Contracts professor, I have considerable faith in negotiations and the efficiency of
contracts, perhaps a little more than most Torts instructors. But even among those of us with faith
in the free market, blind assertions of universal efficiency are rare.
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Indeed, Rubin and Shepherd’s data on fatal accidents might be largely
attributable to shortages of care after an accident rather than to the rate at
which serious accidents occur.9
But the argument goes a little deeper. As tort liability affects
providers of goods or services, it drives up their prices. Higher prices
may lead buyers to postpone purchases of new goods and services. If
newer products include better safety features, postponing replacement
purchases may leave consumers subject to the higher risks of their older
products. The same could apply to services, as postponing repairs or
upgrades leaves people with less safe alternatives. Thus, the tort system
may deter conduct that would increase safety.10
The data Rubin and Shepherd present suggest that some tort
reforms, particularly those that reduce the magnitude of the liability,
have exactly this affect. The following questions may aid scholars in
probing this data and lead to more probative results as further study
progresses.11
Two aspects of the study may impair its value. First, it reports only
fatal accidents.12 Second, it reports data only for the year immediately
preceding and immediately following enactment of various tort
reforms.13 Each choice limits the ability to extrapolate from the data.
Fatal accidents appear to be a rather small sample of all accidents.
In addition, they may be the segment least affected by tort reform
because most wrongful death statutes already limit recovery to pecuniary
losses, and caps on nonpecuniary damages do not reduce liability for
fatalities.14 Thus, the decision to rely on data regarding fatal accidents
seems to have been a practical decision because the data is easier to
generate.
Fatal accidents are relevant because a reduction in fatal accidents
9. Rubin & Shepherd note research suggesting that emergency physicians are drawn to states
with tort reform, “findings [that] may be particularly relevant for our analysis of accidental deaths,
for a lack of emergency physicians will result in more accidents that lead to death.” Rubin &
Shepherd, supra note 1, at 6.
10. See id. at 5. The ability to price discriminate among states may raise questions. Medical
care tends to be state specific. Perhaps repair services, too, are obtained locally. Mass-produced
goods, however, can be obtained by mail or online, making it difficult for a producer to charge less
in states where tort reforms reduce liability costs. These improvements should be observed
nationwide, not just in states with reforms. In addition, the price adjustments after tort reform may
be modest if insurance costs depend on nationwide experience.
11. See supra note 2.
12. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 10.
13. See id. at 11.
14. If defendants were following the old wisdom that it is cheaper to kill a victim than to
injure them, a reduction in fatalities might flow from reducing the gap between damages for death
and damages for severe injuries. That, however, seems a pretty far-fetched explanation of the data.
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may reflect a reduction in total accidents. The overall rate of serious
accidents probably correlates with the rate of fatal accidents. In
addition, efforts to reduce accidents generally should reduce both fatal
and nonfatal accidents. A risk producer rarely knows whether the
accident resulting from the risks it creates will be fatal; its precautions
probably reduce the aggregate risk. Thus, the findings may have value,
but their usefulness is unclear at this time.15
The second issue, using only data from one year immediately
preceding and following enactment of various tort reform statutes,
causes more concern for Rubin and Shepherd’s study and explanatory
theory.16 First, the study does not test whether the reforms have any
enduring effect. Second, Rubin and Shepherd’s explanatory theory
assumes that the reduction in accidents would follow immediately upon
enactment of tort reforms
Tort reforms, once enacted, should continue to affect the liability
system over their life. Any reduction in the rate of fatal accidents,
however brief, is welcome. But if the theory outlined above is correct,
the differences between states with and without tort reform should
remain evident in the second and third year after enactment. People in
states with tort reform will experience cheaper access to goods and
services that enhance safety, producing continued improvements relative
to people in other states. Perhaps Rubin and Shepherd are already
working to analyze longer term effects of tort reforms.
Including later years is a critical concern given the second issue, the
assumption that tort reforms immediately affect accident rates.
Intuitively, it seems unlikely that tort reforms will have an immediate
affect on defendants’ finances or practices.17 For one thing, the dates
when tort reform statutes take effect may differ from the date of
enactment.18 In addition, the reforms may apply prospectively to
15. Greater availability of emergency care physicians reduces the fatalities resulting from
accidents without reducing the number of accidents. If this factor explains much of the effects
observed, extrapolation to nonfatal accidents may be quite weak. See supra note 9.
16. Including later years in the data can pose some problems. As time passes, other changes
occur that might affect the rate of fatal accidents, for better or worse. Looking at the period just
after enactment helps control for those other changes. A five-year average might obscure the effects
in the first year, misleading us to believe that tort reform harms safety – or it might exaggerate the
effects of the first year by including reductions caused by factors unrelated to tort reform. Still,
Rubin and Shepherd seem adept at the statistical techniques for isolating the effects of tort reform.
17. Even Rubin & Shepherd expressed some surprise that the results were observable within
one year of enactment. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 14.
18. Rubin and Shepherd refer to “death rate trends in the years before and after the enactment
of certain tort reforms.” Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 11; see also id. at 12 (“enactment,”
“enacted”), 13 (“enacted”). Perhaps their language was simply imprecise; they may use the
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accidents occurring after the effective date or to cases filed after the
effective date, rather than to all cases tried after the effective date. Yet
in the first two cases, defendants continue to pay unreformed awards for
at least a year after the effective dates.19 Finally, these savings will
redound to defendants only after insurers incorporate them into their
premiums.
Considering the ways tort reform might improve the accident rate,
an immediate effect in the first year seems quite unlikely. The theory
requires that safer goods and services become cheaper, allowing more
people to use them, thus reducing accident rates. For that to work, the
defendant must experience a savings – or at least anticipate a savings –
that it can pass on to customers. For most defendants, that will mean
reduced insurance costs (relative to states without tort reform), though
for some (who self-insure) it might mean reduced damage awards.20
Insurers might build expected reductions into their premiums the minute
the reforms are enacted. But it seems equally likely that they will
hesitate long enough to gather actuarial data on the degree that damage
awards decline, then pass on the savings in rate reductions. When they
do, the potential defendants will experience reduced costs. Those
savings might be passed on to customers immediately, increasing the
number of people who can afford these safety enhancements. As more
people take advantage of the new opportunities, the rate of fatal
accidents declines.
How much can be crammed into the first year after the statute takes
effect? Note the assumptions required: (1) That optimism over the effect
of the reform will cause insurers to lower premiums immediately rather
than await actual savings; (2) That policy renewal dates will occur early
enough after the effective date to permit insureds to reap savings in the
first year, or that similar optimism about reduced premiums produces an
effective dates of tort reform statutes. The following sentences of text raise problems that apply, to
some degree, even if the authors used the effective date of the reforms.
19. A defendant with a claims-made policy up for renewal immediately after the enactment
may see an immediate reduction in premiums if the reform applies to claims made after the effective
date of the statute.
20. Reducing the time devoted to lawsuits by corporate personnel might have a more
immediate effect. This, however, seems to require a reduced number of lawsuits, not a reduced
amount at issue in the lawsuits. Even a modest claim allows plaintiff to conduct discovery, which
costs employee time and money. Of course, if tort reform leads more plaintiffs not to sue or leads
them to settle before discovery, these savings might figure into the calculation. The immediate
effect might be modest if the reform applied to accidents occurring after the effective date of the
statute. Even an accident the next day is unlikely to reach the discovery stage for several months, so
savings will occur in the last half of the year. A law applying to all claims filed after the effective
date would produce savings sooner, though still only for part of the year.
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immediate price decrease in anticipation of savings; (3) That the
insureds pass the savings on to their customers;21 (4) That customers
recognize the savings and decide to upgrade to safer goods and
services;22 (5) That the upgrades are completed early enough in the year
that a significant number of fatal accidents do not occur.23
This is arm-chair scholarship. Rubin and Shepherd easily might
respond (patiently or scornfully): “Read the results. It seems to have
happened.” It is unclear why it happened, and why it seems to have
happened across the board in response to tort reforms in different years
and different states. Some data (from other careful, scholarly,
empiricists) suggests that tort reforms may not have immediate effects.
For example, William Sage notes that malpractice reforms seem to
increase the number of physicians in a state, but that the effect begins to
be felt about three years after the enactment of reforms.24 But that is a
thin reed upon which to assess the data analyzed by Rubin and
Shepherd.
Yet one wonders whether some other mechanism explains the
observed data. Might tort reform have an immediate effect on
consumers, even though it has no (or little) immediate effect on
providers? Reducing the amount plaintiffs can recover would logically
lead potential victims to invest more in safety. This might involve
buying safer products, even at higher prices, rather than risk
uncompensated losses via the tort system. It might involve conducting
themselves in a safer manner – reducing risky activity, taking more
precautions against remote risks, etc. This kind of change seems likely
to follow enactment of the law when the publicity is greatest, not
necessarily its effective date. It would apply regardless of how

21. I will not argue that either the insurer or the insured will decide not to reduce prices.
Competitive pressure should encourage price reductions. Whether local price reductions are
possible at all in a national or international market is another question, one taken up shortly.
22. Advertising of new low prices seems likely to produce relatively quick recognition of the
lower prices.
23. Even when aware of newly affordable prices, some consumers move slowly to make
significant investments, or to replace their less safe goods with safer goods, unless the less safe
goods are worn out. For instance, having once bought a child’s car seat, a price reduction is
unlikely to persuade parents to buy a second, newer one immediately. They may bemoan the fact
that they could have afforded the better model if the price decrease had occurred sooner. But
relatively few rush to discard their original seat just because a better one no longer costs more than
the one they bought.
24. William M. Sage, Prof. of Law, Columbia Law School (Remarks at University of San
Diego, Nov. 3, 2005). The increase does not stem from an exodus of doctors or from an influx of
experienced practitioners. Rather, it arises from delayed retirements and greater attractiveness to
doctors deciding where to begin their practice.
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prospective the statute was into later years; any loss prevented by
consumers would be affected by the reform, even though the effect of
the statute (in reducing compensation) would be felt years later.
One might hail this as an indication that tort reform is effective, but
it is not clear that tort reform is efficient. Perhaps prevention by
consumers is less costly than prevention by producers. Alternatively,
however, consumers might over-invest in prevention, exaggerating risks,
misjudging their source, etc. Producers can reduce the risk for all, rather
than relying on consumers individually to reduce risks (or not).
One might argue that prevention by consumers assumes an unlikely
level of rationality. Do consumers pay attention to tort reform statutes?
Do they project the likely implications for themselves? Do they adjust
the riskiness of their conduct in response?
Read Rubin and Shepherd’s data; tort reform apparently has
reduced the number of fatal accidents. Skepticism about the mechanism
proposed by this article seems well judged. But so is skepticism about
the mechanism proposed by Rubin and Shepherd, which is similarly
based on assumptions about rational economic behavior.25 The results
do not support either hypothesis more strongly than the other. It is
simply too soon to conclude that tort reform promotes safety by making
safety more affordable for consumers.
II. EFFECT OF COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE ON FATALITY RATES
If one assumes that everything Rubin and Shepherd argue is
correct, a serious puzzle still remains. Why would reforming the
collateral source rule differ from damage caps and other tort reforms?
Why would fatal accidents increase when that reform was enacted? The
effect was observed for two different versions of reform: offsetting
collateral benefits against damages, and making evidence of collateral
benefits admissible (apparently without requiring an offset, but leaving
the jury able to adjust their award on this basis).26 The offset approach
relates more strongly to increases in fatal accidents.
Rubin and Shepherd address this topic briefly, noting prior
evidence of this effect27 and then observing:
25. See Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 1. Rubin and Shepherd originally noted four
assumptions on which tort liability efficiently deters. The February revision added a fifth: that
“victims as well as injurers have incentives to take optimal precautions.” Id. This revision permits
them to claim both mechanisms within their thesis. The revised paper does not claim that
precautions by consumers are more efficient than precautions by providers.
26. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 9.
27. Id. at 6 (citing Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform
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Apparently for this variable, the externality increasing effect outweighs
the safety increasing effect. Note that other reforms reduce the amount
of damage payments for a harmful event, while collateral source
reform may lead injurers to paying [sic] nothing at all in certain
circumstances. Thus, it may not be surprising that this reform has
larger injury increasing effects than do others. A more efficient reform
might be increased subrogation (in which the injured party’s insurance
company pays the victim and then collects from the injurer) since this
will maintain incentives for internalization while still avoiding double
compensation to victims.28

This is the entire discussion, not an excerpt of it.
Rubin & Shepherd’s explanation seems plausible, but incomplete.
For one thing, collateral source limitations often will not eliminate
plaintiff’s damages. Collateral sources reduce damages only by the
amount of plaintiff’s recovery from other sources of compensation, such
as insurance. But many losses will be uncompensated. While many
Americans have health insurance, disability insurance, covering income
lost during recovery, is much less common. Even under health
insurance, large deductibles, coinsurance, and limitations on coverage or
procedures may leave substantial expenses uncompensated. Insurance
almost never compensates for nonpecuniary losses. Punitive damages,
too, would be unaffected. Thus, the collateral source rule rarely will
allow “injurers to pay nothing at all . . . .”29
Reforms to the collateral source rule could eliminate plaintiff’s
recovery, however, if they undermine a plaintiff’s willingness to sue. By
reducing, perhaps severely, the most easily proven aspect of damages,
reforms to the collateral source rule may make a lawsuit seem like more
hassle than it is worth. Larger claims seem likely to be brought: those
where (uninsured or partially insured) disability is permanent, those
where pain and suffering loom large, and those where anger runs higher.
But a plaintiff whose primary loss is pecuniary and who has recovered
most of it via insurance may decide to waive the rest of the claim or to
settle it quickly.
In this regard, a synergy may exist between reforms of the collateral
source rule and damage caps. Damage caps may reduce the other
reasons to file a claim. If collateral source reform reduces pecuniary
damages and a damage cap reduces other damages, even more claims
Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter (Nov. 3, 2005) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=453481.
28. Rubin & Shepherd, supra note 1, at 16.
29. Id.
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may go unfiled or settle early. The combined effect of the two rules will
reduce lawsuits far more than either one alone.
The order in which various reforms are adopted might affect the
results. Where collateral source reform precedes damage caps, the
remaining reasons to sue may keep a sufficient flow of litigation to
encourage substantial precautions by defendants. But, where damage
caps have already reduced the incentive for litigation, adding changes to
the collateral source rule may produce a drastic decline in litigation and,
thus, a corresponding decline in the incentive for injurers to take
precautions against the risks they create. The results reported by Rubin
and Shepherd do not permit an evaluation of these potential interactions.
Perhaps they will consider this possibility in future studies.
At least one more factor deserves brief discussion. Collateral
source reform tends to strike at smaller claims, while damage caps strike
at larger claims. Because smaller claims substantially outnumber larger
claims,30 a damage cap will affect relatively few suits. Tampering with
the collateral source rule, on the other hand, may affect every lawsuit to
some extent. It is likely to deter many suits rather than just a few,
producing substantial savings to injurers. Eliminating suits produces
savings in employee time far in excess of reforms that allow the suit to
proceed but merely cap damages. Even if the amount saved per suit is
relatively small, the volume of suits affected may give this reform a
much larger impact than damage caps.
Many object that tort reform limits the recovery of those who
suffered the greatest losses at the hand of tortfeasors (by capping their
damages rather than allowing full compensation). This focus on the
largest awards benefits a few plaintiffs and their attorneys – who can
retire on 30% of a very big award, but can barely make a living on 30%
of many small awards. Perhaps Rubin and Shepherd will help us refocus
on the more common smaller claims. Deterring these seems much more
significant.
This mechanism does not differ greatly from that suggested by
Rubin and Shepherd. It fleshes out the way suits may disappear.
In exploring the way collateral source reform might over-deter
litigation and under-deter risk-creation by injurers, the decision to use
data for only one year becomes more significant. To the extent that tort
reforms discourage plaintiffs from filing suits, that effect seems likely to
occur in the first year. If tort reforms apply to all cases tried after the
30. That is one reason that median damage awards are much lower than average damage
awards.
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effective date, settlements or voluntary dismissals seem likely for a large
number of pending cases. If the reforms apply to cases filed after the
effective date, filings would begin to decline almost immediately. If tort
reforms applied to accidents that occurred after the effective date, then
filings would taper off during the year.31
As a result, defendants would realize an immediate savings from
these reforms. Potential defendants save the transaction costs of suits
when suits are deterred entirely. No time need be spent investigating
records to inform their attorneys about the allegations, no time goes into
preparing documents for discovery or answering interrogatories, no time
is wasted by lawyers interviewing employees. The incentive effects are
immediate and Rubin and Shepherd identify them: an increase in fatal
accidents, apparently related to the decrease in precautions potential
defendants take.
This differs substantially from damage caps. Damage caps will
produce savings, if at all, in future years, as cases come to trial.32
Defendants may not know whether particular precautions will prevent a
smaller claim or a larger one. Precautions may prevent accidents, with
only luck determining whether they will be severe or minor. As a result,
defendants retain an incentive to minimize total accidents. A damage
cap, therefore, might not save some defendants a dime, as they might be
unlucky enough to cause a really serious accident. Larger companies
may have enough volume to expect that they will cause some large
damages in the future, but a smaller company may have no basis upon
which to book the savings immediately. The prospect looks better, but
until the company experiences a savings, either in judgments or in
premiums, it doesn’t know whether it can reduce precautions. These
reductions in precautions will occur in future years, as experience
mounts.
This leaves a particularly gruesome possibility: perhaps the
reduction in fatal accidents following damage caps is temporary. Once
real reductions are felt, precautions will be reduced, and fatalities will
rise. This mirrors the results from the collateral source rule. Rubin and
Shepherd may have discovered that the collateral source reform
31. Until the statute of limitations ran on injuries that occurred before the effective date,
filings would remain undeterred by the reforms. But filings for new accidents would not keep pace
with prior years, causing a gradual reduction in filings.
32. Settlements of cases that will be governed by the damage caps also produce savings, as
lawyers negotiate amounts with an eye on the likely recovery at trial. Depending on the
retroactivity of the tort reform, these savings may be realized in future years rather than
immediately. Perhaps the incentive to take precautions disappears immediately. The cap will apply
to future accidents, even if it does not apply to past accidents.
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undermines the incentive to take precautions that will minimize
accidents. But if the lead time differs between the two types of reforms,
their data may have missed the fact that, in subsequent years, damage
caps may have exactly the same effect. The timing of the effect, not the
direction of the change, may differ between the two types of reforms.
These suggestions are no more than hypotheses. Empiricists such
as Rubin and Shepherd deserve praise for trying to test hypotheses such
as these against actual data. Perhaps these thoughts will help Rubin and
Shepherd refine their approach in the next round of analyses of their
data. In the meantime, these doubts should dampen the enthusiasm for
tort reforms. Whatever the case for them, it seems too soon to place a
reduction in fatal accidents among the justifications.
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